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Abstract
This paper proposes a generic approach for providing enhanced security to communication systems
which encode their data for reliability before encrypting it through a stream cipher for security. We
call this counter-intuitive technique the encoding-encryption paradigm, and use as motivating example
the standard for mobile telephony GSM. The enhanced security is based on a dedicated homophonic or
wire-tap channel coding that introduces pure randomness, combined with the randomness of the noise
occurring over the communication channel. Security evaluation regarding recovery of the secret key
employed in the keystream generator is done through an information theoretical approach.
We show that with the aid of a dedicated wire-tap encoder, the amount of uncertainty that the ad-
versary must face about the secret key given all the information he could gather during different passive
or active attacks he can mount, is a decreasing function of the sample available for cryptanalysis. This
means that the wire-tap encoder can indeed provide an information theoretical security level over a pe-
riod of time, but after a large enough sample is collected the function tends to zero, entering a regime in
which a computational security analysis is needed for estimation of the resistance against the secret key
recovery.
Keywords: error-correction coding, security evaluation, stream ciphers, randomness, wireless communi-
cations, homophonic coding, wire-tap channel coding.
1 Introduction
Most communication systems take into account not only the reliability but also the security of the data
they transmit. This is particularly true in wireless environment, where the data is inherently more sensible
to security threats. Consequently, the design of such systems need to include both coding schemes for
providing error-correction and ciphering algorithms for encryption-decryption. It is common practice to
first encrypt the data to ensure its safety, and then to encode it for reliability. In this paper, we consider
the reverse scenario, namely systems which first encode the data, and then encrypt it, which we call the
encoding-encryption paradigm.
Though counter-intuitive at first, there are actually many real life applications where the encoding encryp-
tion paradigm is used. A famous illustrative example is the most widespread standard for mobile telephony
GSM, standing for “Global System for Mobile Communications” (see [2] and [1], for the coding, respectively
security details). In the GSM protocol, the data is first encoded using an error-correction code so as to
∗Fre´de´rique Oggier is with Division of Mathematical Sciences, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore. Miodrag Mihaljevic´ is with Mathematical Institute, Serbian Academy of Sciences and
Arts, Belgrade, Serbia, and with Research Center for Information Security (RCIS), Institute of Advanced Industrial Science
and Technology (AIST), Tokyo, Japan. Email: frederique@ntu.edu.sg, miodragm@turing.mi.sanu.ac.rs. Part of this work
already appeared at IEEE ICT 2010.
1
withstand reception errors, which considerably increases the size of the message to be transmitted. The
encoded data is then encrypted to provide privacy (secrecy of the communications) for the users.
It is interesting to mention that block ciphers are not suitable in the context of the encoding-encryption
paradigm, since the receiver needs to first decrypt the data despite the noise, before performing the decoding.
This leads to use of stream ciphers and thus when we refer to the security of systems using the encoding-
encryption paradigm, we implicitly mean the security of the keystream generator and the users’ secret key.
From a security perspective, there are of course pros and cons to the encoding-encryption paradigm. Since
it implies encryption of redundant data (introduced by error-correction), it could be an origin for mounting
attacks against the employed keystream generator. Undesirability of redundant data from a cryptographic
security point of view has indeed been already pointed out in the seminal work by Shannon [18], where
cryptography as a scientific topic has been established. On the other hand, the encoding-encryption paradigm
has the advantage to offer protection in the case of a known plaintext attacking scenario, since an adversary
can only learn a noisy version of the keystream, which makes the cryptanalyis of the employed keystream
generator more complex.
Security evaluation can be performed under two attacking scenarios, depending on whether one considers
an active or passive adversary.
A passive adversary’s ability is limited to monitoring (and recording) communications between the le-
gitimate parties, so as to use the recorded data as input for mounting a known plaintext attack against the
considered system.
Stronger attacks come from active adversaries, which can possibly include many attacking settings. In this
paper, we consider active attacks motivated by the class of so-called Hopper and Blum (HB) authentication
protocols [8],[9], [10],[6],[5]. Following the original work by [8], HB authentication protocols are challenge-
response based, where the response could be considered as the encoded and encrypted version of the challenge,
which is deliberately degraded by random noise. A simple active attack on the improved HB+ authentication
protocol [10] was provided in [4], where it is assumed that an adversary can manipulate challenges sent during
the authentication exchange, and thus learn whether such manipulations give an authentication failure. The
attack consists of choosing a constant vector and using it to perturb the challenges by computing the XOR
of the selected vector with each authentication challenge vector, and that for each of the authentication
rounds. To summarize, the active attacker has the following abilities: (i) he can modify the data in the
communication channel between the legitimate parties; and (ii) he can can learn the effect of the performed
modification at the receiving side. This is the model that will be adopted in this work.
To evaluate the security of systems using the encoding-encryption paradigm under threats of both passive
and active adversaries as described above, both computational and information theoretical analyses are valid.
In this paper, we focus on the latter. We propose a security enhanced approach which employs a dedicated
coding, following the frameworks of homophonic [11, 12, 17] and wire-tap channel coding [20, 19]. The
improved security is a consequence of combining the pure randomness introduced by the wire-tap coding
and the random noise which is inherent in the communication channel.
We measure the security increase with respect to the secret key in terms of its equivocation, that is
the amount of uncertainty that the adversary has on the key, given all the information he can collect. A
preliminary study of the security enhancement has been provided in [16] in the case of a passive adversary.
The enhancement is based on the constructions reported in [14, 15], and also motivated by the fact that in the
computational complexity evaluation scenarios, this approach provides resistance against the generic time-
memory trade-off based attacking approaches [7, 13], and particular powerful techniques like the correlation
attacks [3].
Motivation for the Work. The aim of this work is to propose and elaborate a model for the security evaluation
of communication systems which employ the encoding-encryption paradigm together with a dedicated wire-
tap encoder for security enhancement. In a general security evaluation scenario, both passive and active
attacks should be treated, and while the enhanced system should be resistant to these, it should be with a
slight/moderate increase of the implementation complexity and the communications overhead. It may be
worth emphasizing that our target is to increase the security of existing schemes, such as GSM, which is
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why we have a small margin of freedom in designing the security scheme, since we cannot touch most of the
existing components of the system.
Summary of the Results. This paper proposes and analyzes from the information-theoretic point of view the
security of communications systems based on the encoding-encryption paradigm under passive and active
attacks, when equipped with an additional wire-tap encoder. We show that with the aid of a dedicated
wire-tap encoder, the amount of uncertainty that the adversary must face about the secret key given all the
information he could gather during different passive or active attacks he can mount, is a decreasing function
of the sample available for cryptanalysis. This means that the wire-tap encoder can indeed provide an
information theoretical security level over a period of time, but after a large enough sample is collected the
function tends to zero, entering a regime in which a computational security analysis is needed for estimation
of the resistance against the secret key recovery.
Organization of the Paper. In Section 2, we start by describing precisely the system model together with
its security enhanced version and we dedicate Subsection 2.2 to the design of the wire-tap encoder. The
security analysis is done in two parts: first the passive adversary is studied in Section 3, while the active
one is investigated in Section 4. Practical implications of the given security analysis and some guidelines
for design of security enhanced encoding-encryption based systems are pointed out in Section 5. Concluding
remarks including some directions for future work are given in Section 6.
2 System Model and Wiretap Coding
We consider a class of communication systems which, to provide both reliability and security, employs the
encoding and then encryption paradigm, namely: the message is first encoded, and then encrypted using a
stream ciphering.
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Figure 1: Communication system model.
The detailed model is shown in Figure 1. The transmitter first encodes a binary message/plain text
a = [ai]
m
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}
m
using an error-correcting code CECC
b = CECC(a) = [bi]
n
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}
n,
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that maps a m-dimensional plain text to an n-dimensional encoded message, n > m. The encryption is done
using a keystream generator, which takes as input the secret key k of the transmitter, and outputs
x = x(k) = [xi]
n
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}
n
yielding
y = y(k) = CECC(a)⊕ x = [yi]
n
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}
n (1)
as the message to be sent over the noisy channel, where ⊕ denotes XOR or modulo 2 addition. We denote
the noise vector by
v = [vi]
n
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}
n
where each vi is the realization of a random variable Vi such that Pr(Vi = 1) = p and Pr(Vi = 0) = 1 − p.
Upon reception of the corrupted encrypted binary sequence of ciphertext
z = z(k)
= y + v
= CECC(a) ⊕ x⊕ v = [zi]
n
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}
n,
the receiver who shares the secret key k with the transmitter can decrypt first the message
(CECC(a) ⊕ x⊕ v)⊕ x = CECC(a)⊕ v ∈ {0, 1}
n,
and then decode a despite of the noise thanks to the error-correction code. We remark that in practice a
keystream generator can be considered as a finite state machine whose initial state is determined by the
secret key and some public data. For simplicity, and because it does not affect our analysis, we can ignore
the existence of the known data, and focus on the secret key. In this setting the output of the keystream
generator is determined uniquely by the secret key, and it is enough to assume that the transmitter and
receiver only share the key.
Note further that the trick of reversing the order of encryption and error-correction would not have been
possible if a block cipher was used for encryption, since decryption must be done before removing the channel
noise.
We finally assume that there is a noiseless feedback link that connects the receiver to the transmitter, so
that the receiver can either acknowledge the reception of the message, or inform of the decoding failure, so
as to get the missing message sent back.
2.1 Enhanced model
Origins for the construction given in this paper are the approaches for stream ciphers design recently reported
in [14, 15], though the focus of this paper is very different, since its goal is enhancing the security of
existing encryption schemes. This difference has a number of implications regarding the security issues and
implementation complexity of the scheme.
The construction proposed in this paper employs the following main underlying ideas for enhancing
security:
• Involve pure randomness into the coding&ciphering scheme so that the decoding complexity without
knowledge of the secret key employed in the system approaches the complexity of the exhaustive search
for the secret key.
• Enhance security of the existing stream cipher via joint employment of pure randomness and coding
theory, and particularly a dedicated encoding following the homophonic or wire-tap channel encoding
approaches.
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• Allow a suitable trade-off between the security and the communications rate: Increase the security
towards the limit implied by the secret-key length at the expense of a low-moderate decrease of the
communications rate.
Regarding the homophonic and wire-tap channel coding, note the following. The main goals of homo-
phonic coding are to provide: (i) multiple substitutions of a given source vector via randomness so that
the coded versions of the source vectors appear as realizations of a random source; (ii) recoverability of the
source vector based on the given codeword without knowledge of the randomization. The main goals of
wire-tap channel coding are: (i) amplification of the noise difference between the main and wire-tap channel
via randomness; (ii) a reliable transmission in the main channel and at the same time to provide a total
confusion of the wire-tapper who observes the communication in the main channel via a noisy channel (wire-
tap channel). Accordingly, homophonic coding schemes and wire-tap channel ones have different goals and
belong to different coding classes, the source coding and the error-correction ones, but they employ the same
underlying ideas of using randomness and dedicated coding for achieving the desired goals.
For enhancing the security we exploit the underlying approaches of universal homophonic coding [12] and
generic wire-tap coding when the main channel is error-free (see [20] and [19], for example). Accordingly,
we may say either “homophonic coding” or “wire-tap channel coding” to address the dedicated coding that
enhances security. The main feature of the dedicated coding is that the encoding is based on randomness
and that the legitimate receiving party who shares a secret key with the corresponding transmitting one
can perform decoding without knowledge of the randomness employed for the encoding. For simplicity of
the terminology we mainly (but not always) say “wire-tap channel coding” to describe the dedicated coding
which provides the enhanced security.
Let CH(·) denote a wiretap or homophonic code encoder. To enhance the security of the system consid-
ered, it is added at the transmitter end (see Figure 2) involving a vector of pure randomness
u = [ui]
m−ℓ
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}
m−l,
that is, each ui is the realization of a random variable Ui with distribution Pr(Ui = 1) = Pr(Ui = 0) = 1/2.
Note that CH(·) is invertible. The wiretap encoding is done prior to error-correcting encoding, thus out of
the m bits of data to be sent, m− l are replaced by random data, letting actually only l bits
a = [ai]
l
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}
l
of plaintext, to get as in (1)
y = y(k) = CECC(CH(a||u)) ⊕ x (2)
as codeword to be sent. As before, the receiver obtains
z = z(k) = y ⊕ v = CECC(CH(a||u)) ⊕ x⊕ v (3)
and starts with the decryption
y = (CECC(CH(a||u)) ⊕ x⊕ v)⊕ x = CECC(CH(a||u))⊕ v.
He then first decodes
CH(a||u).
If the decoding is successful, he computes a using C−1H and let the transmitter know he could decode.
Otherwise he informs the transmitter than retransmission is required.
Similarly to a linear error-correction code where CECC can be represented by multiplying the data vector
by the generator matrix of the code, we can write CH , following the so-called coset encoding proposed by
Wyner [20], as follows:
CH(a||u) = [a||u]


h1
h2
...
hl
GC

 = [a||u]GH , (4)
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Figure 2: Communication system model enhanced with a wire-tap encoder.
where
• GC is a (m − l) × m generator matrix for a (m,m − l) linear error-correction code C with rows
gC1 ,g
C
2 , . . . ,g
C
m−l,
• h1,h2, . . . ,hl are l linearly independent row vectors from {0, 1}
m\C,
• and GH is a m×m binary matrix corresponding to CH(·).
In words, to each l-bit message a = [a1, . . . , al] is associated a coset determined by
a 7→ a1h1 ⊕ a2h2 ⊕ . . .⊕ alhl ⊕ C.
Though this correspondence is deterministic, a random codeword c is chosen inside the coset by:
c = a1h1 ⊕ a2h2 ⊕ . . .⊕ alhl ⊕ u1g
C
1 ⊕ u2g
C
2 ⊕ . . .⊕ um−lg
C
m−l
where u = [u1, u2, . . . , um−l] is a uniformly distributed random (m− l)-bit vector.
2.2 A Dedicated Wiretap Encoder
In our scenario, we need to combine wiretap encoding with error-correction encoding, both being linear
operations. Recall that the encoded vector at the transmitter is
CECC(CH(a||u)),
where a is a l-dimensional data vector, and u is a m − l random vector. Using generic coset coding as
discussed above with a (m,m− l) code, we now know that
CH(a||u) = [a||u]GH ,
where GH is an m×m matrix, and thus
CECC(CH(a||u)) = CECC([a||u]GH)
= [a||u]GHGECC
= [a||u]G (5)
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where GECC is an m × n binary generator matrix corresponding to CECC(·), and G = GHGECC is an
m× n binary matrix summarizing the two successive encodings at the transmitter.
Since GH multiplies the vector [a||u] where a is an l-dimension vector and u an (m− l) dimension vector,
it makes sense to write the m×m matrix GH by blocks of size depending on l and m− l:
GH =
[
G
(1)
H G
(2)
H
Im−l G
(4)
H
]
(6)
where G
(1)
H is an l × (m − l) matrix, G
(2)
H is an l × l matrix, Im−l denotes the (m − l) × (m − l) identity
matrix, and finally G
(4)
H is an (m− l)× l matrix.
Requirements on the matrix GH are:
1. Invertibility. The matrix GH should be an invertible matrix, so that the receiver can decode the
wiretap encoding.
2. Security. The matrix GH should map [a||u] so that in the resulting vector each bit of data from a is
affected by at least one random bit from u, to make sure that each bit of data is protected.
3. Sparsity. Both the matrices GH and G
−1
H should be as sparse as possible, in order to avoid too much
computation and communication overheads.
Since by (4), the m− l last rows of GH form a generator matrix of a (m,m− l) error correction code C in
systematic form, it has rank m− l. The first l rows are then obtained by adding linearly independent vectors
not in C, thus completing a basis of {0, 1}m, resulting automatically in an invertible matrix. A simple way
to do so is to choose G
(1)
H = 0l×(m−l) and G
(2)
H = Il, so that (6) becomes
GH =
[
0l×(m−l) Il
Im−l G
(4)
H
]
.
Since
[a||u]
[
0l×(m−l) Il
Im−l G
(4)
H
]
= [u, a+ uG
(4)
H ],
and G
(4)
H has no column with only zeroes (it is a block of an error correction code), we have that indeed each
bit of data from a is affected by at least one random bit from u.
The choice of G
(1)
H = 0l×(m−l) and G
(2)
H = Il makes the l first rows of GH as sparse as possible.
Example 1 Take m = 4, l = 2 so that m− l = 2, and
GH =
[
G
(1)
H G
(2)
H
I2 G
(4)
H
]
=


0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1

 .
Clearly GH is invertible. The error correction code described by rows 3 and 4 is simply the repetition code.
3 Security against a Passive Adversary
This section analyzes the security of the proposed scheme against a passive adversary, that is an adversary
limited to monitoring and recording communications. The system we consider already uses a keystream
generator to protect the confidentiality of the data. Thus though a passive adversary may try to still
discover confidential messages, more dangerous is an attack against the secret key, which would endanger
all the transmissions. Based on what a passive adversary can do, this means mounting a known plaintext
7
attack in order to recover the secret key. In the passive known plaintext attacking scenario, with no enhanced
security, the adversary possesses the pair
(plaintext, noisy ciphertext) = (a, z = CECC(a) ⊕ x⊕ v),
from which he calculates
CECC(a) ⊕ z = x⊕ v.
He can then use x ⊕ v for further processing in an attempt to recover the key which generated x. We will
show how the introduction of the wiretap encoding increases the protection of the key against such attacks.
In what follows, we use as notation that
• ui, random bits used in the wiretap encoder,
• xi, output bits of the keystream generator,
• vi, random components of the additive noise
are realizations of certain random variables Ui, Xi and Vi, respectively, i = 1, 2, ..., n. We can further assume
that the plaintext is generated randomly, and thus see ai as a realization of a random variable Ai as well.
The corresponding vectors of random variables are denoted as follows: Al = [Ai]
ℓ
i=1, U
m−l = [Ui]
m−ℓ
i=1 ,
Xn = [Xi]
n
i=1, and V
n = [Vi]
n
i=1.
Recall from (3) and (5) that the received vector at the receiver is given by
z = CECC(CH(a||u)) ⊕ x⊕ v
= [a||u]G⊕ x⊕ v
where G = [gi,j ]
m
i=1
n
j=1 is an m× n matrix containing both the wiretap and the error correction encoding.
Let z = [zi]
n
i=1, so that z can be written componentwise as
zi = ((
ℓ⊕
k=1
gk,iak)⊕ (
m−ℓ⊕
k=1
gℓ+k,iuk)⊕ xi)⊕ vi, i = 1, 2, ..., n,
and zi appears as the realization of a random variable Zi:
Zi = ((
ℓ⊕
k=1
gk,iAk)⊕ (
m−ℓ⊕
k=1
gℓ+k,iUk)⊕Xi)⊕ Vi, i = 1, 2, ..., n.
We further denote Zn = [Zi]
n
i=1, and
Zn = CECC(CH(A
l||Um−l))⊕Xn ⊕Vn. (7)
From (6), we have
CH(A
l||Um−l) = [Al,Um−l]GH
= [Al,Um−l]
[
G
(1)
H G
(2)
H
Im−l G
(4)
H
]
= [AlG
(1)
H ,A
lG
(2)
H ] + [U
m−l,Um−lG
(4)
H ],
and we can rewrite the wiretap encoder as
CH(A
l||Um−l) = CH,a(A
l)⊕ CH,u(U
m−l),
8
where CH,a and CH,u are the operators for the wiretap encoding restricted to a, resp. u:
CH,a(A
l) = [AlG
(1)
H ,A
lG
(2)
H ], CH,u(U
m−l) = [Um−l,Um−lG
(4)
H ].
Since the error correcting encoding is also linear, we finally get
Zn = CECC(CH,a(A
l))⊕ CECC(CH,u(U
m−l))⊕Xn ⊕Vn. (8)
The lemma below gives a bound on the resistance of the scheme to a known plain text attack where the
adversary knows the pair (a, z).
Lemma 1 The equivocation of the keystream output knowing the plaintext and the received signal can be
lower bounded as follows:
H(Xn|Al,Zn) ≥
min{H(Um−l), H(Xn) +H(Vn)}+
min{H(Vn), H(Xn)} − δ(CECC),
where
δ(CECC) = H(ǫ) + ǫ log(2
m−l − 1)
→ 0
since ǫ→ 0.
Proof. Employing the entropy chain rule, we have that
H(Al,Um−l,Xn,Vn,Zn)
= H(Al) +H(Zn|Al) +H(Um−l|Al,Zn) +
H(Vn|Al,Um−l,Zn) +H(Xn|Al,Um−l,Vn,Zn)
= H(Al) +H(Zn|Al) +H(Um−l|Al,Zn)
+H(Vn|Al,Um−l,Zn),
since H(Xn|Al,Um−l,Vn,Zn) = 0, using that Xn = CECC(CH(A
l||Um−l))⊕ Zn ⊕Vn from (7).
Repeating the entropy chain rule but with another decomposition, we further get that
H(Al,Um−l,Xn,Vn,Zn)
= H(Al) +H(Zn|Al) +H(Xn|Al,Zn) +
H(Um−l|Al,Xn,Zn) +H(Vn|Al,Um−l,Xn,Zn)
= H(Al) +H(Zn|Al) +H(Xn|Al,Zn)
+H(Um−l|Al,Xn,Zn),
noticing that H(Vn|Al,Um−l,Xn,Zn) = 0 using again Vn = CECC(CH(A
l||Um−l))⊕ Zn ⊕Xn from (7).
By combining the two decompositions, we deduce that
H(Xn|Al,Zn)
= H(Um−l|Al,Zn) +H(Vn|Al,Um−l,Zn)
−H(Um−l|Al,Xn,Zn).
We now reformulate H(Um−l|Al,Zn) and H(Vn|Al,Um−l,Zn). First, using this time (8), we have that
CECC(CH,u(U
m−l)) = CECC(CH,a(A
l)) ⊕ Zn ⊕Xn ⊕Vn. Since CECC and CH are invertible, note that
H(CECC(CH,u(U
m−l))) = H(Um−l), so that
H(Um−l|Al,Zn) = H(Xn ⊕Vn).
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On the other hand, conditioning reduces entropy, namely,
H(Um−l|Al,Zn) ≤ H(Um−l),
and in order to make explicit the role of the extra randomness brought by the wiretap encoder, we can write
that
H(Um−l|Al,Zn) = min{H(Um−l), H(Xn ⊕Vn)}
= min{H(Um−l), H(Xn) +H(Vn)}
since Xn and Vn are mutually independent.
Similarly, again using (8) to get that Vn = CECC(CH,u(U
m−l)) ⊕ CECC(CH,a(A
l)) ⊕ Zn ⊕ Xn and
combining with
H(Vn|Al,Um−l,Zn) ≤ H(Vn),
we obtain that
H(Vn|Al,Um−l,Zn) = min{H(Vn), H(Xn)},
which distinguishes the randomness coming from the channel noise and the keystream entrpy.
We are finally left with bounding H(Um−l|Al,Xn,Zn). RecoveringUm−l when Al, Xn and Zn are given
is the decoding problem of removing the noise Vn employing the code CECC with error probability Pe. This
can be bounded using Fano’s inequality:
H(Um−l|Al,Xn,Zn) ≤ H(Pe) + Pe log(2
m−l − 1)
≤ H(ǫ) + ǫ log(2m−l − 1)→ 0
since by design of the system, we may assume Pe = ǫ→ 0. This concludes the proof.
The interpretation of the lemma is a bound on the resistance of the scheme to a passive known plain text
attack. This clearly depends on two parameters:
• the keystream generator: if the output of the keystream generator has a very high entropy H(Xn) ≥
H(Um−l,Vn) = H(Um−l) +H(Vn), then the lemma tells that
H(Xn|Al,Zn) ≥ H(Um−l) +H(Vn)− δ(CECC).
• the pure randomness put in the wiretap encoder: if we do not add it in the system, the lemma shows
that
H(Xn|Al,Zn) ≥ H(Vn)
that is the information-theoretic security of the keystream depends on the channel noise.
We illustrate this last claim with an example.
Example 2 Consider the case of a known plaintext attack when a = 0. We then have
zi = xi ⊕ (
m−ℓ⊕
k=1
gℓ+k,iuk)⊕ vi, i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Without the wiretap encoding, the keystream xi is corrupted and so protected as well by the noise on the
channel, while with addition of the wiretap encoder, it is further protected by the pure randomness added.
The special case where the channel is noisefree is detailed in the corollary below. This further illustrates
the effect of pure randomness involved in the wire-tap channel coding.
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Corollary 1 In a noisefree channel, we have
H(Xn|Al,Zn) ≥ min{H(Um−l), H(Xn)}.
Proof. Since the channel is noisefree, V = 0 and consequently H(V ) = Pe = 0. Lemma 1 can be rewritten
as
H(Xn|Al,Zn)
≥ min{H(Um−l), H(Xn)} +
min{0, H(Xn)} − δ(CECC)
= min{H(Um−l), H(Xn)}.
So far, we have discussed the security of a given keystream generator output, for one instance of trans-
mission. We now move to a more realistic scenario. Transmission takes place over time t = 1, 2, . . .,
and the keystream generator uses a secret key (or just a key) K based on which it computes its outputs
X(t) = [X
(t)
i ]
n
i=1 in a deterministic way depending on f for a time period of length τ :
X(t) = X(t)(K) = f (t)(K), t = 1, . . . , τ.
Note that f (t)(K) is an expansion of the secret key K via a finite state machine and can be considered as
an encoding of |K| bits into a long binary codeword. Correspondingly, we can rewrite the whole system in
terms of realizations of random variables that depends on time, over the time interval t = 1, . . . τ :
• A(t) = [A
(t)
i ]
ℓ
i=1 for the plain text,
• U(t) = [U
(t)
i ]
m−ℓ
i=1 for the pure randomness used in the wiretap encoder,
• V(t) = [V
(t)
i ]
n
i=1 for the channel noise,
• Z(t) = [Z
(t)
i ]
n
i=1 for the received signal.
Similarly as above, we have
Z(t) = CECC(CH,a(A
(t))⊕ CH,u(U
(t)))⊕ f (t)(K)⊕V(t).
The key K is represented as a vector of random variables drawn independently from a uniform distribution
over {0, 1}, so that H(K) = |K|. We further use the following block notations:
Aτl = [A(1)||A(2)|| . . . ||A(τ)]
Uτ(m−l) = [U(1)||U(2)|| . . . ||U(τ)]
Vτn = [V(1)||V(2)|| . . . ||V(τ)]
Zτn = [Z(1)||Z(2)||...||Z(τ)].
We can now state the main theorem of this section, which describes the security of the enhanced system
against a passive adversary regarding the secret key recovery.
Theorem 1 When Pr(V
(j)
i = 0) 6= Pr(V
(j)
i = 1) 6= 1/2, i = 1, 2, ..., n, j = 1, 2, ..., τ , there exists a threshold
τthres such that
H(K|Aτl,Zτn)
{
> 0 for τ < τthres
→ 0 for τ ≥ τthres .
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Proof. When τ = 1, X(1) = Xn = f (1)(K) and accordingly H(X(1)) = H(K), thus Lemma 1 directly
implies that H(Xn|Al,Zn) = H(K|Al,Zn) > 0 is achievable.
When τ > 1 grows, we employ the following analysis.
By using two different decompositions of H(Aτl,Uτ(m−l),Xτn,Vτn,Zτn) via the entropy chain rule as
done in Lemma 1, we get
H(K|Aτl,Zτn)
= H(Uτ(m−l)|Aτl,Zτn) +H(Vτn|Aτl,Uτ(m−l),Zτn)
−H(Uτ(m−l)|Aτl,K,Zτn). (9)
Note that knowing Aτl, Zτn can be considered as a τn-length degraded version of a binary codeword with
τ(m − ℓ) + |K| information bits which is corrupted by a noise vector Vτn. Indeed, without knowing the
key, decoding Uτ(m−l) is not possible, so the adversary also needs to try to decode K. Assuming that the
decoding error probability of this code is P ∗e , Fano’s inequality implies that
H(Uτ(m−l)|Aτl,Zτn) < H(Uτ(m−l),K|Aτl,Zτn)
≤ H(P ∗e ) + P
∗
e log(2
τ(m−ℓ)+|K| − 1) .
Combining the decoding ability of CECC with a minimum distance decoding yields a decoding error for the
aggregated code of size 2τ(m−ℓ)+|K| that tends to zero provided long enough codewords, that is P ∗e → 0, and
accordingly H(Uτ(m−l)|Aτl,Zτn)→ 0 when τ is large enough.
In a similar manner and employing
H(Vτn|Aτl,Uτ(m−l),Zτn) < H(Vτn,K|Aτl,Uτ(m−l),Zτn),
the decoding ability ofCECC with a minimum distance decoding as used above implies thatH(V
τn|Aτl,Uτ(m−l),Zτn)→
0 when τ is large enough.
To take care ofH(Uτ(m−l)|Aτl,K,Zτn), we again use a decoding argument, since Zτn is known. However,
it is important to note here that K is known too. Thus even though we look at a block
Uτ(m−l) = [U(1)||U(2)|| . . . ||U(τ)],
the knowledge of K makes each block U(t) independent, and thus we can decode each of them separately
and the probability of error is P τe . Fano’s equality finally yields
H(Uτ(m−l)|Aτl,K,Zτn) ≤ H(P τe ) + P
τ
e log(2
τ(m−l) − 1)
≤ H(ǫτ ) + ǫτ log(2τ(m−1) − 1)
and
H(Uτ(m−l)|Aτl,K,Zτn)→ 0 (10)
since Pe = ǫ→ 0 by design of CECC .
The above consideration of the cases τ = 1 and τ >> 1 also implies the existence of a threshold τthres.
The statement is intuitively clear. The security depends on the length |K| of the key noting that this
length is fixed in the system. Accordingly, when the keystream generator is used for a period τ that varies, as
long as τ < τthresh, the key is protected by the randomness of the noisy channel and of the wiretap encoder,
but that protection cannot last forever if the adversary collects too much data.
Note that all this analysis is true for “realistic channels” where the noise is not uniformly distributed. The
uniformly distributed noise in the communication channel makes error-correction infeasible, which explain
the assumption in the above theorem.
Theorem 1 directly implies the following corollary for noiseless channels.
Corollary 2 When Vτn = 0 and the parameter τ is large enough we have:
H(K|Aτl,Zτn) = 0 . (11)
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4 Security against an Active Adversary
We now consider an active and therefore more powerful adversary. There are many possible scenarios for an
active adversary. We assume in this work that
1. he can modify the data on the communication channel, that is, inject controlled noise,
2. he can learn the effect of the modified channel at the receiving side, by listening to the feedback link
that tells whether decoding was successful.
Let us be more precise. While the transmitter sends
y = CECC(CH(a||u)) ⊕ x
in an already security enhances setting (2), the receiver sees its noisy version
z = y ⊕ v.
The active adversary is allowed to inject some extra noise v∗ over the channel, so that now, the legitimate
receiver sees y⊕v′, where v′ contains both the noise v coming from the channel and the noise v∗ controlled
by the adversary:
z = y ⊕ v ⊕ v∗
= CECC(CH(a||u)) ⊕ x⊕ v ⊕ v
∗. (12)
As earlier (Section 2), the receiver first decrypts its message using its secret key and locally generated
keystream
z⊕ x = CECC(CH(a||u)) ⊕ v ⊕ v
∗
and then try to decode z⊕ x:
C−1ECC(z⊕ x) = C
−1
ECC(CECC(CH(a||u)) ⊕ v ⊕ v
∗)
= CH(a||u)
under the assumption that the error correcting code can correct the errors introduced by v, so as to get
a = C−1H (C
−1
ECC(z⊕ x)).
Because of the extra noise v∗, the probability of decoding correctly at the receiver may decrease. In the
meantime, the active attacker can listen to the feedback channel so that he knows whether the decoding
failed or was successful. His goal is again to find the key. His strategy then consists in adding different noise
vectors v∗ and to observe the feedback channel to see whether the chosen noise made the decoding fail, in
order to gather information.
We keep our earlier notation, that is
• ui, random bits used in the wiretap encoder,
• xi, output bits of the keystream generator,
• v′i, random components of the additive noise v
′ = v ⊕ v∗,
• ai, bits of the plain text,
• zi, bits of the received message
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are realizations of certain random variables Ui, Xi, V
′
i , Vi, Vi
∗, Zi, i = 1, 2, ..., n and Ai, i = 1, . . . , l.
The corresponding vectors of random variables are denoted as follows: Al = [Ai]
ℓ
i=1, U
m−l = [Ui]
m−ℓ
i=1 ,
Xn = [Xi]
n
i=1, V
′n = [V ′i ]
n
i=1, V
n = [Vi]
n
i=1, V
∗n = [Vi
∗]ni=1, and Z
n = [Zi]
n
i=1. Similarly to (8),
Zn = CECC(CH,a(A
l))⊕ CECC(CH,u(U
m−l))⊕Xn ⊕Vn ⊕V∗n. (13)
Finally, let fd be a binary flag which indicates whether the decoding result is indeed a or has failed, and
accordingly fd can be considered as a realization of a binary random variable Fd.
The lemma below gives a bound on the resistance of the scheme to an active attack where the adversary
not only controls the noise but also knows a, z and fd.
Lemma 2 The equivocation of the keystream segment knowing the plaintext, the received signal, and the
decoding tag, can be lower bounded as follows:
H(Xn|Al,Zn, Fd) ≥
min{H(Um−l), H(Xn) +H(Vn|Fd)} +min{H(V
n|Fd), H(X
n)} − δ(CECC),
where
δ(CECC) = H(Pe) + Pe log(2
m−l − 1)→ 0,
since Pe → 0.
Proof. As in Lemma 1, we start with two different chain rule decompositions of the same joint entropy.
On the one hand,
H(Al,Um−l,Xn,V′
n
,Zn, Fd)
= H(Al) +H(Zn|Al) +H(Um−l|Al,Zn) +
H(Fd|A
l,Um−l,Zn) +H(V′
n
|Al,Um−l,Zn, Fd) +
H(Xn|Al,Um−l,V′
n
,Zn, Fd)
= H(Al) +H(Zn|Al) +H(Um−l|Al,Zn)
+H(V′
n
|Al,Um−l,Zn, Fd),
since from (13) we have thatXn = CECC(CH(A
l||Um−l))⊕Zn⊕V′
n
implyingH(Xn|Al,Um−l,V′
n
,Zn, Fd) =
0, and H(Fd|A
l,Um−l,Zn) = 0, since knowingAl and Zn, decoding can be performed on Z and the decoded
value can be compared to Al, yielding Fd.
On the other hand,
H(Al,Um−l,Xn,V′
n
,Zn, Fd)
= H(Al) +H(Zn|Al) +H(Xn|Al,Zn) +
H(Fd|A
l,Xn,Zn) +H(Um−l|Al,Xn,Zn, Fd) +
H(V′
n
|Al,Um−l,Xn,Zn, Fd)
= H(Al) +H(Zn|Al) +H(Xn|Al,Zn)
+H(Um−l|Al,Xn,Zn, Fd),
noticing that H(V′
n
|Al,Um−l,Xn,Zn, Fd) = 0, again using from (13) that V
′n = CECC(CH(A
l||Um−l))⊕
Zn ⊕Xn, and that H(Fd|A
l,Xm−l,Zn) = 0 for the same reason as above.
By combining the two decompositions, we deduce that
H(Xn|Al,Zn) = H(Um−l|Al,Zn, Fd) +H(V
′n|Al,Um−l,Zn, Fd)−H(U
m−l|Al,Xn,Zn, Fd), (14)
where
H(Um−l|Al,Zn, Fd) = min{H(U
m−l), H(Xn ⊕V′
n
|Fd)}
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since CECC(CH(U
m−l)) = CECC(CH(A
l))⊕ Zn ⊕Xn ⊕V′
n
implies that
H(Um−l|Al,Zn, Fd) = H(X
n ⊕V′
n
|Fd)
and conditioning reduces entropy, namely,
H(Um−l|Al,Zn, Fd) ≤ H(U
m−1).
Similarly, again using (13) and that
H(V′
n
|Al,Um−l,Zn, Fd) ≤ H(V
′n|Fd),
we obtain that
H(V′
n
|Al,Um−l,Zn, Fd) = min{H(V
′n|Fd), H(X
n)}.
To summarize, Equation (14) is now given by
H(Xn|Al,Zn)
= min{H(Um−l), H(Xn ⊕V′
n
|Fd)} +min{H(V
′n|Fd), H(X
n)}
−H(Um−l|Al,Xn,Zn, Fd)
where V′
n
= Vn +V∗n and V∗n is known to the adversary, so that we in fact have
H(Xn|Al,Zn)
= min{H(Um−l), H(Xn) +H(Vn|Fd)}+min{H(V
n|Fd), H(X
n)}
−H(Um−l|Al,Xn,Zn, Fd)
using further that Xn and Vn are mutually independent.
We are finally left with bounding H(Um−l|Al,Xn,Zn, Fd). For the adversary, recovering U
m−l when
Al, Xn and Zn are given is the decoding problem of removing the noise Vn (he knows V∗n) employing the
code CECC with error probability Pe. This can be bounded using Fano’s inequality:
H(Um−l|Al,Xn,Zn, Fd) = H(U
m−l|Al,Xn,Zn)
≤ H(Pe) + Pe log(2
m−l − 1)
since knowing whether the receiver could decode the worst noise does not affect the error capability of CECC .
This concludes the proof.
Let us compare the result of Lemmas 1 and 2:
H(Xn|Al,Zn) ≥ min{H(Um−l), H(Xn) +H(Vn)} +min{H(Vn), H(Xn)} − δ(CECC),
H(Xn|Al,Zn, Fd) ≥ min{H(U
m−l), H(Xn) +H(Vn|Fd)}+min{H(V
n|Fd), H(X
n)} − δ(CECC),
where
δ(CECC) = H(Pe) + Pe log(2
m−l − 1)→ 0,
since Pe → 0. As expected, the equivocation in the case of an active adversary is smaller than for a passive
adversary, since H(Vn|Fd) ≤ H(V
n).
Based on the above, we easily get a counterpart of Theorem 1 for the case of an active adversary.
Theorem 2 When Pr(V
(j)
i = 0) 6= Pr(V
(j)
i = 1) 6= 1/2, i = 1, 2, ..., n, j = 1, 2, ..., τ , there exists a threshold
τthres,act such that
H(K|Aτl,Zτn, Fd)
{
> 0 for τ < τthres,act
→ 0 for τ ≥ τthres,act .
We have that τthres,act < τthres, the threshold for a passive adversary.
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Proof. When τ = 1, X(1) = Xn = f (1)(K), Lemma 1 directly implies that H(Xn|Al,Zn, Fd) =
H(K|Al,Zn, Fd) > 0 is achievable.
When τ > 1 grows, we know from (9) that
H(K|Aτl,Zτn, Fd)
= H(Uτ(m−l)|Aτl,Zτn, Fd) +H(V
τn|Aτl,Uτ(m−l),Zτn, Fd)
−H(Uτ(m−l)|Aτl,K,Zτn, Fd). (15)
Now it is shown in the proof of Theorem 1 that every term tends to zero, using a decoding argument, which
will hold similarly here, since the knowledge of Fd cannot make the decoding more difficult.
5 Practical Implications and Applications Issues
This section provides a generic discussion of the usefulness and possible applications of the proposed approach.
5.1 Implications of the security evaluation
The analysis given in Sections 3 and 4 shows that in systems where the encoding-encryption paradigm is
employed, involvement of pure randomness via concatenation of dedicated wire-tap and error-correction
coding (instead of error-correction only) provides an increased cryptographic security, by combining pseudo-
randomness, randomness and coding, which in a known-plaintext cryptanalytic scenario implies an increased
resistance against threats on the secret key.
The performed information-security evaluation more precisely points out the following desirable security
properties of the proposed approach: (i) When the sample available for cryptanalysis is below a certain size,
the scheme provides uncertainty about the secret key; (ii) Complexity of the secret key recovery appears as a
highly computationally complex problem even if the available sample is such that the posterior uncertainty
about the secret key tends to zero. The main consequence of (i) is that even if exhaustive search were to
be employed for the secret key recovery, a (large) number of candidates will appear. The statement (ii) is
an implication of the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, where the reduction to zero of the posterior uncertainty
about the secret key appears assuming employment of a decoding which has complexity proportional to the
exhaustive search over all possible secret keys. Accordingly, the uncertainty tends to zero at the expense of
a decoding with exponential complexity. Actually, the decrease of the uncertainty about the secret key with
the increase of the sample available for cryptanalysis appears as a consequence of decoding capabilities of a
low rate random binary block codes, but at the expense of the decoding complexity which is exponential in
the secret key length.
The above features (i) and (ii) hold not only in a passive attacking scenario where the attacker per-
forms cryptanalysis based on recording the ciphertext from a public communication channels, but also in
certain active attacking scenarios where the attacker can modify the ciphertext and learn the effects of these
modifications.
5.2 Framework for applications
The encoding-encryption paradigm for secure and reliable communications enjoys the following desirable
properties: (i) When the decryption is performed by bitwise XORing the keystream to the ciphertext, an
error in a bit before decryption causes an error in the corresponding bit after decryption, without any error-
propagation, and (ii) Provides non-availability of the error-free keystream when the communication channel
is a noisy one.
The proposed approach for enhancing the security of the communications systems which follow encoding-
encryption paradigm could be employed in the design of these systems from scratch as well as in upgrading
of the existing ones.
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In the case of upgrading the existing systems, the implementation assumption is that the employed,
already existing, binary linear block error-correction code (m,n) which encodes m bits into a codeword from
GF (2n), could be replaced with a binary block code (m′, n) with the same error correction capability but with
m′ > m. Accordingly, m′ −m random bits can be concatenated with m information bits and mapped into
the new m-bits via a homophonic encoder. The obtained output from homophonic encoder is the input for
the error-correcting one. Taking into account the notation from Section 2, the previous means that instead
of performing CECC(a) which is a linear mapping {0, 1}
m → {0, 1}n, the following should be performed:
CECC(CH(a||u)) where a||u is a concatenation of an m-dimensional vector and an m
′−m-dimensional one,
CH(·) is a linear mapping {0, 1}
m′ → {0, 1}m
′
and CECC(·) is a linear mapping {0, 1}
m′ → {0, 1}n. On
the receiving side, the decoding procedures after decryption are straightforward (see Fig. 2): The error
correction decoding removes the random errors, and the message a is obtained by truncating of the inverse
linear mapping corresponding to the homophonic decoding.
In the case of a design of the encoding-encryption system from the scratch, the design should include a
coding box which performs the concatenation of homophonic and error-correction coding in a manner which
fits the rate of the concatenated code to the given constraints.
Note that from an implementation point of view, replacement of a linear block encoding by a concate-
nation of a block linear homophonic and error correction encoding is a replacement of one binary matrix
with another binary matrix which is the product of the matrices corresponding to the homophonic and
error-correction encoders. Accordingly, the implementation complexity of two concatenated codes could be
approximately the same as the implementation complexity of an error correcting code only.
6 Conclusion
The problem addressed in this paper is the one of enhancing security of certain communications systems
which employ error correction encoding of the messages and encryption of the obtained codewords in or-
der to provide both secrecy and reliability of the transmission. This paper yields a proposal for provid-
ing the enhanced security of the considered systems employing randomness and dedicated coding and the
information-theoretic security evaluation of the proposed approach. The analysis given in this paper implies
that in the systems where the encoding-encryption paradigm is employed, the cryptographic security can
be enhanced via involvement of a homophonic coding based on pure randomness as follows: Instead of just
error-correction encoding before the encryption, this paper proposes employment of a concatenation of linear
block homophonic and error-correction encoding. The proposal and its cryptographic security evaluation are
given in a generic manner and accordingly yield a generic framework for particular applications.
Note that the information-theoretic consideration of the cryptographic security yields a basic evaluation
of the related cryptographic features. On the other hand, the information-theoretic security evaluation also
provides specification of the settings when it is possible to perform the secret key recovery, but it does not
specify and only indicates the expected complexity of this problem. We show that with the aid of a dedicated
wire-tap encoder, the amount of uncertainty that the adversary has about the key given all the information
he could gather during different passive or active attacks he can mount, is a decreasing function of the
sample available for cryptanalysis. This means that the wire-tap encoder can indeed provide an information
theoretical security level over a period of time, after which a large enough sample is collected and the function
tends to zero, entering a regime in which a computational security analysis is needed.
An interesting issue for further work is the characterization of the transition region in which the uncer-
tainty drops from a certain value to close to zero. Also, because after all, the uncertainty tends to zero, the
computational complexity based evaluation of cryptographic security is a direction for a future work.
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